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RECENT CASES

TORTS-RESTRICTION

ON SELF HELP-PROPERTY OWNERS NO

LONGER HAVE A RIGHT TO REGAIN

POSSESSION BY USING

REASONABLE NECESSARY FORCE; DEFENDANT IS LIABLE IN TORT
FOR INJURIES AND DAMAGES RESULTING FROM FORCIBLE ENTRY

REGARDLESS

OF WHO HAS TITLE. Daluiso v. Boone (Cal. 1969).

Daluiso filed a complaint against Boone to recover
compensatory and exemplary damages for personal injuries
arising out of trespass to real and personal property. The court
found that his complaint, based on the following facts, stated a
cause of action in tort for the intentional infliction of emotional
distress.' Plaintiff, an eighty-five year old man with
arteriosclerosis, was the former owner of Melody Ranch. 2 In
1934, he conveyed the ranch to his son, Salvatore, who gave
plaintiff permission to reside there for the rest of his life. 3 In 1961,
without prior notice to the Daluisos, defendant Boone, an adjacent
landowner, and two employees entered part of the ranch and
proceeded to move one of the boundary fences to conform to a
survey which had been completed in 1956. 4 The survey showed
that the fence was located on defendant's property, and therefore
he wanted it moved to represent what he believed was the real
I. 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965) provides that: "One who by
extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress
to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm results from
it, for such bodily harm."
2. In regard to the effect of plaintiff's physical condition upon the liability of
defendant, see W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 11, at 51 (3rd ed. 1964), in which he states:
"[E]xcept in cases where the defendant has knowledge of the plaintiff's peculiar
susceptibility and practices upon it, the distress must be such as a reasonable man of
"ordinary sensibilities" would undergo under the circumstances." Prosser also suggests
that this knowledge may, in itself, render the conduct in question outrageous.
Still another basis on which extreme outrage may be found lies in defendant's
knowledge that the plaintiff is especially sensitive, susceptible and vulnerable
to injury through mental distress at the particular conduct. . . . [The gist of
the outrage is the defendant's knowledge of the plaintiff's vulnerability, and
where there is no knowledge, conduct which is not otherwise sufficiently
extreme leads to no liability, even though the plaintiff may in fact suffer
serious injury because of it.
Prosser, Insult and Outrage,44 CALIF. L. REV. 40, 50 (1956).
3. Salvatore testified that the plaintiff had always been on the ranch, and that it was
part of his life. Although there was no express agreement between plaintiff and his son,
the court concluded that a tenancy at will had been established since plaintiff had
undertaken to take care of the land.
4. Another neighbor, Salvatore, and Boone shared the cost of this survey and the
results were known to all concerned parties. Boone and Salvatore had had discussions
concerning the moving of the fence but had never reached an agreement.
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boundary line between the two properties. 5 While defendant was
moving the fence, plaintiff appeared and requested that he stop;
defendant refused. Attempting to protect his and his son's right
to the disputed property, plaintiff became engaged with defendant
in a heated verbal controversy.' This confrontation resulted in
plaintiff's "physical, mental, and nervous shock." ' After
determining that defendant knew his conduct was substantially
certain to produce plaintiff's injuries, that his conduct was
intentional and the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries, the trial
court awarded plaintiff $15,000 in compensatory damages.'

Defendant contended on appeal that the trial court erred in failing
to determine who had title to the land on which the fence was

located, claiming a privilege to regain the land by use of any
reasonable force necessary.9 The California Supreme Court held,
5. After the trial of the instant action, the appeal of Daluiso v. Boone, 269 Cal.
App.2d 482, 75 Cal. Rptr. 287 (1969), in an action to quiet title, was decided in favor of
Salvatore Daluiso. The court found that the fences indicated the correct boundary line and
that the survey was, in fact, incorrect. The results of this action had no effect on the instant
appeal, however.
6. For a discussion of property rights as they relate to the tort of infliction of mental
distress, see 28 A.L.R.2d 1089, § 6, which points out that:
Even where there is no element of personal danger and the mental disturbance
. * * arises solely from the plaintiff's distress at the injury to his property
interests, recovery . . . has been allowed in a number of cases where it
appeared that the defendant's act amounted to a wilful or malicious trespass,
and that the mental anguish was a proximate result of this wrongful act ...
[W]here the mental distress . . .arose solely as an incident of property
damage and the elements of malice or wilfulness did not appear, courts have
appeared reluctant to allow such damages.
7. Ferdinando Daluiso, the original plaintiff, died during the pendency of this appeal.
Salvatore Daluiso, his executor, was substituted as respondent. "Plaintiff" in the appellate
case refers to Ferdinando.
8. This award was not the result of a sympathetic jury; it was a nonjury trial.
Defendant never contended on appeal that his conduct did not constitute the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress, nor did he contend that the damages awarded
were excessive.
9. This contention was based on the California Supreme Court holdings in Canavan
v. Gray, 64 Cal. 5, 27 P. 788 (1833), and Walker v. Chanslor, 153 Cal. 118, 94 P. 606
(1908), which held that title was a complete defense to a tort action arising from an
owner's forcible entry; they limited a wrongful possessor's remedy to an action under a
forcible entry statute.
The applicable statute in effect then and now is CAL. CODE Civ. PROC. § 1159 (Vest
1955) which provides:
Forcible Entry Defined: Every person is guilty of a forcible entry who either:
I. By breaking open doors, windows, or other parts of a house, or by
any kind of violance or circumstances of terror enters upon or into any real
property; or,
2. who, after entering peaceably upon real property, turns out by force,
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affirmed: apart from any statutory remedy for a forcible entry,
the peaceable possessor of real property may recover, in tort,
damages to his person or goods caused by the forcible entry of
one who is, or claims to be, the legal owner-title is no defense
to this action. 10 Daluiso v. Boone, 71 Adv. Cal. 503, 455 P.2d 811,
78 Cal. Rptr. 707 (1969).
Daluiso represents a definite change in California tort law.
Prior to Daluiso, a defendant landowner could forcibly enter his
own property and use all reasonable, necessary force to expel a
peaceful, but wrongful, possessor. If, as a proximate result, the
wrongful possessor was injured, the defendant landowner,
although indictable under the Forcible Entry Statute," was
absolutely not liable for the injuries in tort; his title was a
complete defense. Under the English common law, the landowner
had a complete right of forcible entry; the forcible entry statutes
made this entry illegal, but the wrong committed was considered
to be a wrong against the general public, that is, breaking the
peace and the use of self help to settle disputes when courts were
available for this purpose. This entry was not considered a wrong
against the individual who was injured. This note will discuss the
history of this ancient privilege, how the privilege has been
affected by statutes of forcible entry, and how various courts,
including the California Supreme Court in Daluiso, have
construed the statutes to regulate this privilege of self help in land
disputes.
Under the common law, one legally entitled to immediate
possession of land was absolutely privileged to enter and recover
possession by using any amount of force necessary to dispossess
the wrongful possessor. 1 2 Regardless of what injuries were
sustained by the wrongful possessor, to his person or goods,
defendant's title was a complete defense to tort liability. This
privilege of self help could be abused, as in cases of excessive
force, and then defendant was held liable only for damages
resulting from that force which was more than necessary.
threats, or menacing conduct, the party in possession. (Enacted 1872)
In the instant case, the trial court judge stated that since title was not pleaded, and it
was not at issue, it would not be decided by him. The survey results were admitted in
evidence, however, since defendant's motivation had a bearing on exemplary damages.
10. Overruling Canavan v. Gray, 64 Cal. 5, 27 P. 788 (1833), and Walker v.
Chanslor, 153 Cal. 118, 94 P. 606 (1908).
I1.

CAL. CODE

12. 6-A

CIV. PROC.

§

1159 (Vest 1955).

AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY

§ 28.19 (A.J. Casner ed. 1954).
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Generally, however, if the wrongful possessor was unwilling to get
off the land, defendant landowner was not liable in tort for the
use of any force necessary to remove him, including force which
resulted in the death of the possessor. 3 The situation existed where
"He may take who has the power and he may keep who can."14

In an attempt to rectify this situation, to protect those in
peaceful possession from violent entries and to preserve the King's
peace by encouraging those involved in land disputes to turn to
the courts for help, England enacted the Statute of 5 Richard II. t1
This statute partially abrogated the privilege of self help by
imposing criminal sanctions on anyone, regardless of title, who
made a forcible entry onto the peaceful possession of another. The
statute, however, did not expressly provide a civil remedy for the
wrongful possessor or explicitly abolish the privilege of self help

in land disputes. 6 A forcible entry was prohibited by the criminal
statute, but the question of whether the wrongful possessor had
any civil remedy against defendant title holder remained
7
unsettled.
Most American states, to encourage state help as opposed to

self help, have enacted forcible entry statutes similar to 5 Richard
The same question, concerning the availability of a civil
remedy, arose under the American statutes. The statutes make
11.18

forcible entry a crime, and an action under the statutes results
primarily in punitive and pecuniary damages; usually plaintiff's
personal injuries are not compensable in this action. If title is
13. See Burnham v. Stone, 101 Cal. 165, 35 P. 627 (1894), in which the court held
that an owner of land wrongfully held by another was not civilly liable for the killing of
the occupant while resisting the owner's attempt to regain possession without the use of
more force than was necessary.
14. Reeder v. Purdy, 41 111. 279, 285 (1866).
15. 5 RICH. 11 (1381, stat. 1,c.7 provides:
And also the King defeodeth, that none from henceforth make any entry into
any lands and tenaments, but in case where entry is given by the law; and in
such cases not with a strong hand, nor with a multitude of people, but only
in a peaceable [lawful] and easy manner. And if any man from henceforth do
to the contrary, and thereof be duly convict, he shall be punished by
imprisonment of his body, and therefore ransomed at the King's will.
16. See 13 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND 840.46 (2d ed, 1949).
17. See 41 Ili. at 283, in which the court stated: "[W]e must, therefore, regard a
question which one would expect to find among the most firmly settled in the law as still
among the controverted points of Westminster hall."
18. See, e.g., CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1159 (Vest 1955), and CAL. PENAL
CODE § 418 (West 1955).
19. CAL. CODE CiV. PROC. § 1174, n.9 (West 1955), illustrates that: "To the extent
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held a complete bar to tort liability, plaintiff is without effective
remedy for injury to his person or goods. The issue has not been

uniformly resolved in this country-2° "The interpretation placed
,21
upon such statutes necessarily controls the rule ....
This issue, oddly enough, was not brought squarely before the

English Courts until the mid-nineteenth century and was not
settled definitely even at that time.22 Until 1920, the right of a

wrongful possessor, in England, to maintain a civil action against
a defendant landowner was sometimes affirmed and sometimes

denied. A few of the leading cases illustrate the checkered history
of the privilege of self help as a tort defense.
In Newton v. Harland,23 the court held that a landlord who
entered and expelled a tenant holding-over after the expiration of
his term would be liable in an action brought by the plaintiff for
personal damages.
Meriton v. Combs24 overruled Newton in holding that the
defendant landowner had a right to turn out a wrongful possessor

and seize his goods without rendering himself liable to a trespass
action for conversion. Defendant's plea of liberum tenementum
was accepted as a complete defense to the tort.?
that damages are sought for forcible entry upon property, in excess of actual pecuniary
loss sustained, their objectives are punitive and exemplary and they are allowed only in
cases of wrongful acts done deliberately or unconscionably."
20. For contrasting views on this issue, see 41 I11.279, 286 (1866): "We state then
• . . that in our opinion the statutes of forcible entry and detainer should be construed as
taking away the previous common law right of forcible entry by the owner, and that soch
entry must be therefore held illegal in all forms of action." 64 Cal. 5, 6, 27 P. 788, 7 s
(1883), in which the court observed that:
Neither expressly nor by necessary implication does the statute give to a person
in the wrongful possession the right to maintain any other than the action of
forcible entry when such entry is made by the owner, having the right to
entry. . . . T]he rules of the common law are not to be changed by doubtful
implication.
21. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 23 (1941).
22. Newton v. Harland, I Man. & Gr. 644, 666, 133 Eng. Rep. 490, 498 (1840). The
court expressed surprise that the question had remained unlitigated for such a long period
and said: "It is remarkable that a question so likely to arise, should never have been
directly brought before any of the courts sitting in Banc until. . . the present case."
23. Id.
24. 67 E.C.L. 788, 137 Eng. Rep. 1101 (1850).
25. Liberun tenementuln-a plea by the defendant in an action of trespass to real

property that the locus in quo is his freehold.
1951).

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

1066 (4th ed.
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Beddall v. Maitland26 reaffirmed the Newton holding;
damages could be recovered in tort by the wrongful possessor. The
court held that the forcible entry statutes made a possession
obtained by force unlawful, even where it was obtained by the
owner. Therefore, title could be no defense to a tort action arising
from this illegal act.
In accord was Hillary v. Gay,27 in which the court affirmed
a wrongful possessor's right to maintain an action of trespass
against defendant landlord for injury to plaintiff's goods resulting
from defendant's forcible entry. The court stated that "the
conduct of the defendant was unjustifiable . . . .If the defendant
had a right to possession, he should have obtained that possession
' 28
by legal means.
The reasoning in the Newton, Beddall, and Hillary cases was
adopted by a majority of American jurisdictions.2 9 These courts
recognized the inherent dichotomy of a situation in which title is
no defense to an action for forcible entry under the criminal
statute, and title is a complete defense to tort liability in a civil
action.3 0 The majority of American courts have therefore
construed their forcible entry statutes as completely abrogating
the privilege of self help and thereby the courts have provided a
civil remedy in tort against a forcibly entering defendant, even if
he is the legal owner, with right to immeiate possession." Prosser
comments:
The majority rule seems clearly the desirable one. In
virtually all jurisdictions, a summary procedure exists by which
the owner may recover possession by legal process, with only
a brief delay. Few things are more likely to lead to a brawl
than an evicting landlord, throwing out his tenant by main
force. Land cannot be sequestered or removed, and the public
26. 17 Ch. Div. 174 (1881).
27. 6 C. & P. 284, 172 Eng. Rep. 1243 (1883).
28. Id. at 286, 172 Eng. Rep. at 1244.
29. 71 Adv. Cal. at 511.
30. The court, in Reeder v. Purdy, 41 Ill.
279, 285 (1866), observed that:
The law is not so far beneath the dignity of a scientific and harmonious system
that its tribunals must hold in one form of action a particular act to be so
illegal that immediate restitution must be made at the cost of the transgressor,
and in another form of action that the same act was perfectly legal, and only
the exercise of an acknowledged right.
31. 5 POUND, JURISPRUDENCE § 142 (1959).
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interest in preserving the peace would seem to justify the
32
temporary inconvenience to the owner.
In 1920, however, the decision in Hemmings v. Stoke Pages
Golf Club3 3 overruled Newton and Beddall and completely
reversed the English position. In Hemmings, the court observed:
"If the view . . . expressed in Newton v. Harland is correct it

must follow that the law confers upon the lawless trespasser a
right of occupancy the length of which is determined only by the
law's delay. '34 The court accepted the view that:
[T]he plaintiff, having no title to the possession as against his
landlord, can have no right of action against him as a
trespasser, for entering upon his own land, even with force; for,
although the law had been violated by the defendant, for which
he was liable to be punished under criminal prosecution, no,
right of the plaintiff's had been infringed, and no injury had
been sustained by him 3for
which he could be entitled to
5
compensation in damages.
This is the English position today and that of a minority of
American states, which included California until Daluiso.
California has had a forcible entry and detainer statute since
1850.36 The California Penal Code section 418 provides that:
Every person using or procuring, encouraging or assisting
another to use, any force or violence in entering upon or
detaining any lands or other possessions of another, except in
cases and in the manner allowed by law, is guilty of a
misdemeanor.31
In Daluiso, the court states:
The courts of this state have long recognized that the purpose
of these statutes was "to secure a judicial adjustment of
differences [concerning the right to possession of property].
[A]nd thus prevent the parties themselves from redressing or
attempting to redress their own wrongs which is likely to lead
32. W. PROSSER, PROSSER ON TORTS § 23, at 125-26 (3rd ed. 1964).
33. 1 K.B. 720 (1920).
34. Id. at 737.
35. Id. at 733, citing Newton v. Harland, supra notes 22 and 23. The court also points
out that: "Ordinarily a criminal prohibition would give a right of action to any person
specially injured by the prohibition. It does not in this case because against the person
damaged the entry was not wrongful, but rightful.
... Id. at 746.
36. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1159 et seq (West 1955); See note 9, supra.
37. CAL. PENAL CODE § 418 (West 1955), enacted in 1872.
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promote this end it has been consistently held that it is no
defense to an action brought under the forcible entry statute
that the defendant has the title or right to possess the land. 8
At apparent odds with this policy against self help in land
disputes, the courts at the same time refused to construe the
forcible entry statute as abrogating the old common law privilege
of forcible entry by the title holder.3 9 An injured wrongful
possessor had no remedy other than an action under the forcible
entry statute; the remedy provided by the statute was deemed
exclufive. 0 The substance of damages, available under the statute,
is restitution of the premises in order to preserve the status quo
until the question of title can be adjudicated. Along with
restitution, damages for injury to the possessory interest, arising
from the forcible entry, are allowed. This includes pecuniary
damages such as loss of rents or other profits. Damages resulting
from injury to the person or goods of the peaceable wrongful
possessor have not been allowed under the statute. Damages for
menial pain and suffering have been held too remote." Even in a
trespass action for damages arising from a death caused by
defendant landowner's attempt to reclaim his property, damages
have not been recoverable.12 In that case, it was held that the
defendant owner was not civilly liable for the killing since he used
no more force than was necessary to eject the wrongful possessors. 3
The use of more force than that which proximately results in the
death of the wrongful possessor is difficult to contemplate.
Illustrating the reasoning behind the "exclusive remedy" cases in
California and the dichotomy inherent in them, the court reasoned
that:
If the owner of the land .
is reasonably necessary .

. .
. .

makes use of no more force than
he will not be liable to an action

of trespass quare clausum, nor for assault and battery, nor for
injury to the occupant's goods, although . . . it becomes

necessary to use so much force and violence as to subject him
38. 71 Adv. Cal. at 514-15,455 P.2d at 818, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 714.
39. See cases cited in notes 9 and 13, supra.
40. 64 Cal. 5, 27 P. 788 (1883).
41. See Anderson v. Taylor, 56 Cal. 131, 38 Am. R. 52 (1880), for a general
discussion of damages traditionally available in California in an action brought under the

statute.
42. Burnham v. Stone, 101 Cal. 165, 35 P. 627 (1894).
43. Id.
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to indictment

..

for making forcible entry... The statutes

• . . having provided a remedy

. . .

that remedy is exclusive,

so far as the wrongful possessor is concerned; but the public,
being interested in preserving the peace, may punish the owner
for resorting to force."
Even though the state supreme court staunchly maintained
the position of "exclusive remedy" and denied the wrongful
possessor a remedy in tort, at the trial court level juries often
awarded plaintiffs personal damages.45 A general feeling
permeates these cases that defendant landowner's conduct, his
forcible entry, was outrageous behavior, a threat to an orderly,
peaceful society, and that the possessor, with or without title, had
suffered a compensable wrong. The trial court judge in Walker v.
Chanslor6 rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff for actual and
punitive damages and stated: "I don't think if they had a U.S.
patent they would have any right to go there and force parties who
were there wrongfully off the premises. I am not going to try any
'47
question of title.
His judgment was overruled by the California Supreme
Court. In language and reasoning remarkably similar, the trial
court judge in Daluiso stated:
[T]he issue here is in part predicated under these pleadings on
a tort which has no relationship whatever to the legal boundary
line between two parcels of property; and the gravemen of the
tort being the violation of individual rights which are as of then
fixed by the fence line and not by the boundry line.48
He subsequently added that he did not "intend in this action
to make any declaration of who has title to what-that is not
before me

.

.

. [I]t is not at issue and has nothing to do with this

piece of litigation. '49 He was not overruled, and the previous trial
verdicts in favor of the wrongful possessor have been at last
vindicated.
44. Id. at 171-72, 35 P. at 629.
45. See cases cited in notes 9 and 13, supra.
46. 153 Cal. 118, 94 P. 606 (1908). In a controversy over the ownership of certain
oil lands, plaintiff, in possession, was wounded in an exchange of gun fire following
defendants' forcible entry. The court held that the defendants were not liable in tort for
assault and battery since their title was a complete bar to the action.
47. 153 Cal. at 123, 94 P. at 608.
48. 71 Adv. Cal. at 509, n.5, 455 P.2d at 814, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 710.
49. Id.
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The court limits its holding specifically to a peaceable
possessor's action for damages." It does not reach the question
of the rights of a third person peaceably, but incidentally, on the
land, such as a licensee, invitee, or employee of the possessor. In
Reeder v. Purdy, the court stated that "the law could not expel
him who entered if his entry was a lawful entry, and if not, all
the consequences of an unlawful act must attach to it."' 1 The
consequences of committing an unlawful act should appropriately
include the extention of liability in tort for injuries tortiously
inflicted, even upon guests or other bystanders. A third party,
usually no main party to the land dispute, should be able to
maintain a tort action, irrespective of the issue of title.
Defendant's forcible entry is unlawful, not only to the peaceable
possessor and the public in general but to anyone injured as the
proximate result of his unlawful act. If defendant's title is held to
be a bar against tort actions brought by third parties, then he has
partially regained the common law privilege of forcible entry as
to those parties, which is contrary to public policy as expressed
by' the legislature and our courts.5 2 The California Civil Code
provides:
Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his willful
acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his want
of ordinary care or skill in the management of his property or
person except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of
ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself.53
Surely this should be the criteria of tort liability-untempered by
a long outmoded common law privilege.
Daluiso puts a new restriction on self help in California land
disputes. Under the new ruling, a landowner making a forcible
entry is liable for all damages proximately resulting to the
peaceable possessor. Judging from the incidents of violence
reported in the cases in this area, the threat of indictment for a
misdemeanor and liability for pecuniary damages alone was not
50. Id. at 518, n. 14, 455 P.2d at 820-21, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 716-17.
51. See note 14,.supra.

52. A third party, one not in possession, cannot maintain an action under the forcible
entry statute. California courts have construed the statute so that "Ithe remedy is a
summary one, given by the statute to protect the possession, and cannot be extended by
implication to any other than the real occupants." Treat v. Stuart, 5 Cal. 113, 114 (1855).
This situation would be in direct conflict with the public policy expressed in CAL. Civ.
CODE § 3523 (West 1955): "For every wrong, there's a remedy." (Enacted 1872)
53. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714 (West 1955).
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a great enough deterrent to self help. This expansion of liability
should prove to be an active, strong deterrent to landowners who
think they have a right to immediate possession and who
contemplate the forceful use of self help.
Daluiso is surprising only because the decision appears to be
one which should have been reached long ago. The old tradition
of self help in land disputes, so prevalent in the history of the
American West, coupled with the natural reluctance of a
"wrongful" possessor to press his case are logical explanations
for the tardiness of this decision. Wrongful possessors,
particularly tenants behind in their rent and without funds for
legal advice, would be reluctant, except in cases of extreme
outrage, to take their cases to court. With a civil remedy now
available in tort, there should be more instances of the injured
wrongful possessor maintaining causes of action against forcibly
entering defendant landowners. Ancient privileges must give way
to civilized methods of settling disputes.
The Daluiso decision is in accord with the current. trend
toward an increasing regard for human safety which is resulting
in the elimination of artificial limitations of duty and the old
common law defense of title in tort actions.5 4 The court in
55
Rowland v. Christian
pointed out that:
[T]he special rules regarding liability of the possessor of land
are due to historical considerations stemming from the high
place which land has traditionally held in English and
American thought, the dominance and prestige of the
landowning class in England during the formative period of the
rules governing the possessor's liability and the heritage of
feudalism. 6
In discussing the arbitrary limits of liability relating to the
owner and occupier of land, the court notes that California courts
have recognized the failings of these common law rules that
conferred immunity and that "the common law has moved...
toward 'imposing on owners and occupiers a single duty of
reasonable care in all circumstances.' -17 The court concludes that
54. Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal.2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968). See
also, Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal.2d 766, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
55. 69 Cal.2d 108,443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).

56. Id. at 113,443 P.2d at 564-65, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 100-101.
57. Id. at 116, at 443 P.2d at 566, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 102, citing Kermarec v.
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although plaintiff's status, as a trespasser for example, may have
some bearing on the question of liability, status would not be
determinative:
[W]hatever may have been the historical justifications for the
common law distinctions, it is clear that these distinctions are
not justified in the light of our modern society .... 11
The basic theory of tort law is compensation, by one at legal fault,
to the innocent plaintiff. Regardless of whether or not Daluiso
was a wrongful possessor, he was a peaceful, innocent possessor
and now our law more fully protects that possession, not only by
statutory sanctions against forcible entry but by the availability
of a civil remedy. A man's home may not be his castle, legally,
but his peaceful possession of that home is protected by law. His
right to be free from personal injury arising from a forcible entry
is a right paramount to title.
SUSAN PARRY FINLAY
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-VICARIOUS LIABILITY
BENEFIT TEST APPLIED IN RECOGNIZING EXCEPTION TO GOING
AND COMING RULE. Smith v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals
Board (Cal. 1968).
On December 27, 1965, social worker Charles Smith was
fatally injured in a single car accident while driving from his home
to the office. Smith's widow was denied workmen's compensation
benefits on the ground that her husband's death did not occur
while he was acting within the scope of his employment. The
California Supreme Court reviewed the order of the Workmen's
Compensation Appeals Board. Held, annulled: Because Smith
was required by his employer to bring his car to work, the going
and coming rule' did not bar him from receiving workmen's
compensation benefits. Smith v. Workmen's Compensation
Appeals Board, 69 Cal. 2d 814, 447 P.2d 365, 73 Cal. Rptr. 253
(1968).
Compaigne Generale, 358 U.S. 625, 630-31, 3 L.Ed.2d 550, 554-55, 79 S. Ct. 406, 410
(1959).
58. Id. at 117, 443 P.2d at 567, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 103.
I. The rule, as generally stated, is that an employee is not within the scope of his
employment while he is going to or returning from his place of work. See, e.g., I A.
LARSON, LAW OF VORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 15.00 (1968) [hereinafter cited as I A.
LARSON].

